

# THE STRATEGIC ISSUES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE SAHELIAN ZONE: CASE OF CHAD, LIBYA AND MALI

Written by *Oumar Boukar Adogaye*

*Postgraduate School, Faculty of Arts, Letters and Social Sciences at the University of  
Ngaoundere, Cameroon, History Department/ Laboratory of Man and Society, Cameroon*

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## ABSTRACT

This article presents the strategic issues of military interventions in the sahelian zone. However, three years after the publication of the Israel-Palestinian conflict (Adogaye, 2020), the Laboratory of International Relations and Studies Strategic entrusted me the publication of a special article bearing this time on the sahelian zone, but also the challenges of military interventions in the desert area. This choice to look at the sahelian zone was guided by the concern for making a historical analysis scale on the African desert and the profound changes that have affected it for seven years after the death of the Libyan guide Mohammard Kaddhafi in 2011. The mounted of the Islamic group in this case Boko Haram in Chad, in Cameroon, including the civil war with the creation of the Azawad State (6 April 2012) by the dealer's denominated departmental dependence. To the restorate - d'alvursist in the area of the Azawad from April, the extension of the Lac Chad Basin with Boko and the armies in the chain and then the decline under the armies in the northern Mali and Libya, the persistence of the smuggling of trafficking and drug, with the orbuiding in desert zone, Southern-Sudan, Chad, Libye and the Mauritania, the Sahelian inherited colonizations, national borders who are little unfounded from the mosaic of ethnicities (several hundred) that the region is affected by the djihadist groupe. Thus the Touaregs, present in several states of the area and never obtained the autonomy they demanded, have raised several times against the central state. By this observation, the Sahel have also misses resources and is mineralized by corruption. The sahelian zone are unable to secure their cuisine basics such as health, education, housing or transport, but also security. The badly borne boundaries are impossible to control: all imaginable traffic can develop in an almost total impunity. The recent events, such as the war in Libya, have amplified this state of affairs offering various terrorist movements or criminals

of equity opportunities particularly the development of these events show that, the Sahara presents a somber and sad picture. It is in this logic that our study is located. Make introduction plan by analyzing the challenges of interventions in Chad, in Libya including Mali.

**Keywords:** Jihadist, Chad, Mali, Libya, Military, Strategic, Boko Haram

## INTRODUCTION

In the observation of the African scene, it is decisively a recurrent observation. The next reinterethy of the jihadist troops against the Chadian offensive with the tragic end of Marechal Idriss Deby Itno, after the fall of Mohammard Khaddafi and the milking of the blending in the desert, including the civil war since the creation of the state of the Azawad (April 6, 2012) by touareg independents assisted by jihadists, are all the facts that refer to the characterized underdevelopment that the Sahel zone is going. Indeed, the civil war who is shaking Libya currently, the conflict that continues in northern Mali and the one caused by the Boko Haram sect in the Lac Chadian Basin constitute the backbone of the conflict that currently affects the Saharo-sahelian zone. If Bengasi was the theatral of a conjugate emotive of the Arab Spring, it quickly took the form of tribal struggles more than the movement observed in the Maghreb. However, at the start, the Pro-Kaddafi had been sitting to hide it from power with the support of the Organization of North Atlantic Treaty (NATO). This intervention of Nicolas Sarkozy and the British Minister David Cameron to hunt the Libyan guide, was a political idea of maintaining Sarkozy in the face of the presidential elections in France, since both in the Sarkozy and David Cameron who were the main initiators had the main object to reopen the odds that had been blocked by the Islamists who were against clandestine immigration to Europe since the Libyan coast. In Chad, the Islamist sematist Boko Haram that was the Sahel also a salafist branch or Salaf who wanted to return to the Islamic principle was also a political idea of the panarabism salaf. This salafism knows several trends, but depends on Saudi financing that is also linked to the saoud family with the predicting of panarabic or panislamism thought. This conflict armed begins in 2012, following the insurrection of Advanced senalist and independent Feathers Pro-Azawad, which is a Touareg movement in North Malian. This article will analyze the strategic issues of military interventions in the Sahara-Sahelian and civil mutations that have affected the Sahalian space through rebel nourishing movements.

## **THE ISSUES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE DESERT: CASE OF MALI WITH THE FATIM**

On January 2013, the Marechal Idriss Deby Itno President of the Chadian Republic replied to the National Assembly on the Malian crisis, it is through this message dated January 16, that international opinion was officially learned the sending of Chadian troop in Mali. It is a decision desired by the French government led by Francois Holand who, previously, had make the idea of launching Serval Operation to cope with rebel progress towards South Malian of terrorist and djihadist groups. This decision to send troops in external operations is a policy of military bilateral cooperation between the member countries of African Unity (OAU). This idea was hailed by a majority of African public opinion that began to be annoyed by the budget of the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) and UN detention. Yet, we are entitled to ask what are the issues, the objectives and the goals pursued by Chad through this military intervention? In the pursuit of what vital interests this country, ranked among the poorest in the world despite oil, manualized more than two thousands of elite military, two hundred forty vehicles of transportation troops and refueling to support an operation. Poorly defined and very risky contours, since it is not a conventional war as but asymmetric?

In the following lines, in addition to the highlighting of the official reasons for the declared objectives of this intervention, we will try to decrypt the actual motivations, which can reveal, on the one hand, the true issues of the intervention of the Chadian military troops in Mali; and on the other hand, to show how it brings particular lighting on the weaknesses of a state, certainly, "post-conflict" but equally fragile. Weaknesses that are potential sources of destabilization and constitute objective objectives of Chad's willingness to be a regional military power.

## **THE OFFICIAL REASONS AND THE DECLARED OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE SAHEL ZONE**

In the presidential message at the address of the Chadian National Representation, the framework of the deployment of Chadian forces in intervention in Mali (FATIM) is all traced. Among the advanced reasons, one was first invoked of the membership of Chad and Mali to the Sahelian region and joint cooperation organizations such as the Inter-States for the fight

against drought in the Sahel zone (CILSS), the Community of the Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the authority of the Niger Basin (ABN) and then the highlighting of a reputation interest of Chad defense forces and security are amourified in death batters. The Chadian army is, not only a lot and respected, but is most often respected for the high mature of operations. The current theater of operations, the Sahel, has no secret the public, and we can read in the presidential press.

In addition, from the triggering of this crisis, more than nine months ago, more or less open solicitations were sent to Chad for an intervention in favor of the legal authorities of Mali. "The attention given to our country, continues the presidential message to the members, "is certainly the expression of a sign of consideration for the efforts made for peace and stability in Africa, but at the same time it commands us to show many responsibilities as a nation located at the heart of the continent. In addition, since January 11, 2013, the eyes are constantly shot to us to scroll any lower sign of our share with respect to the triggery, France, of the operational servile, in Mali. As a result, Chad could not continue to keep silence. He cannot endropune his bond of burial vis-à-vis the Malian people. That is the reason for which i gave the agreement of Chad at the request of the French authorities so that the mission can be mobilized for the benefit of the operational server from our territory.

In addition, "we made the decision to deploy on the Malian ground a quota of the Chadian National Army to support the efforts of the international community for the restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali. We have acted in accordance with UN Security Council Declaration 2085, 2085, authorizing the deployment of the International Mission of Mali (MISMA), to the appeals of the African Union and the express request. Of January 14, 2013 of the President of the Republic of Mali. These are the official reasons of Chadian military intervention in Mali. Is it really aiming to meet the objectives of national interest? What is the validity of these justifications?

A geopolitical purpose: fight against the jihadist groups to avoid the Islamist contagion of Chad. For a country such as Chad, an "ideological" buffer, "through crossings of all kinds (ethnic, regional, confessional, etc.) and where the religious gives were a factor of communization that has mobilized during the civil war of 1979-1982, the presence of the

(FATIM) in Mali continues a geopolitical purpose: fight against terrorist groups like Mujao, Ansar Eddine, AQMI, and preventing the Islamists of Chad. In the perception and analysis of Chadian leaders, if nothing is done, this Malian crisis will have serious repercussions on the regions of the Sahel and Sahara and would be more broadly a threat to regional and international peace and security. Certainly, for many observers and analysts, the threats of terrorist groups on Chad would not be real and the risks of minimal contagion (Magrin, 2013). Also, this intervention only aims for research and recognition of a regional power status in becoming. What is not quite false, if we refer to certain statements of the Chadian authorities: "The peace and stability found, Chad must assume its status in the sub-region and Africa. Chad is a big country in the heart of the continent and he must fully play his role. "

Yet, in a case as in the other, there are facts and evidence that combines the Chad option to send a quota to Mali. Indeed, in a past not so distant, one of the Al-Sarymlave Islamist and Injurizers, Abdelrazak El Para, of the Salafiste Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), was captured in the Chadian Desert to the Confins of the Tibesti Mountains. Libyan and Malian seizures have been in the correlary the weapons spread and the lack of control over national borders. The porosity of them has increased again. In addition, there is the proximity of Chad with Nigerian nutteron, where Boko Haram, whose fight is religious and the main targets are Christians. In these circumstances, a kamizake attack of an illuminated djihadist in Chad would refuel the interconfessional tensions.

## **THE GEOSTRATEGIC ISSUE: THE QUEST FOR A REGIONAL MILITARY POWER STATUS**

In the light of the geopolitical issue, the merits of the military intervention of a quota of the Chadian National Army in Mali are not here in question. What is problematic is the desire of Chad to be recognized by the international community as a regional military power. It is a legitimate aspiration for any state actor who ambid to play a role on the regional and international scene. But did the Chad have the means of its ambitions in a context where the social situation of its population requires better allocation of oil resources to fight against poverty?



As noted, the lack of prior assessment of expenses and expenses related to this commitment and predictable consequences in terms of human losses are the reasons that have been pushed by a Chadian member, which is more than one presidential majority, requested that the head of the government reflects the situation to the National Assembly. Thus, on April 15, the government went to the National Assembly to answer the elected issues and pose on the situation of FATIM.

In its communication to MPs, in response to this interpellation, the Prime Minister not only posed the human cost of this military intervention, then, at then, a very thirty-six and older souveni-fourteen. He also emphasized the financial cost of this operation for Chad. According to Chadian Prime Minister, apart from some logistical supports of some countries including France, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, China, the United States, the essence of the means used is from national resources of the State budget. If the Chadian military intervention in Mali is, in the context of MISMA, this international operation, authorized by the United Nations Security Council, is not a transit of the budgetized classical peace. As a result, Chad expenses are not insured on the UN budget. Are these expenses going through losses and profits? Chad hopes to be refunded on the Trust Fund in the context of the United Nations UN mandate, for which he failed in his attempt to obtain the commission of the operations.

### **THE RISKY AND CONVICTION OF A DESTABILIZATION**

Faced with this situation, the national opinion began to worry. Thus, by a resolution taken on April 15, 2013, following the interpellation of the Prime Minister by a written question of a member of the party in power, the National Assembly asked the Government of the Republic of Chad to prepare, within a reasonable time, the withdrawal of the FATIM. In addition, she asked him to define the terms of civil repair for the families of deceased soldiers as well as for wounded. Finally, it recommended that the Government to make it possible to enjoy the value of the United Nations and the African Union, the human, material and financial effects of Chad's commitment in Mali.

## **THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MALI**

On January 11, 2013, President François Hollande justified a French military intervention in Mali on the possibility of the collapse of the Malian state against the armed rebellion in the north of the country. The war was thus authorized and explained by the inability of the Malian state to meet the threat. These explanations and analyzes focused on the safe challenges hide more than reveal, including the ontological objectives of the war and its identity issues. In order to reveal them, this article articulates the interaction between the deployment of international violence and the construction of a state and a Malian political imagination. We conclude that peace in Mali in 2013 was sought by the militarization of democratic governance, with the effect of consolidating the pre-warning governance model. Unlike security-based analyzes, this article demonstrates that borders and boundaries of the Malian conflict are not only territorial, but identity and ideological. 11 January 2013.

## **THE CASE OF CHAD**

The transition is a French military operation that took place between 1969 and 1972 in Chad. At the end of 1970, the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region is the first concern of French command, as the libany rehabilitation helps only increase. This leads to a major operation to animate this region in order to facilitate the maintenance of the Chadian army after the withdrawal of French forces. It is led by Colonel Gagnaux, commanding the 6th Ontario Sea (DWC) regime, which has more than one thousand men and additional reinforcement, air support and command. It takes place from January 11 to March 10 and will be recovered from other names in October and then in February - March 1972. The technique used is that of the counter-insurgency.

Although rebel strips are not destroyed, the Frolinat still benefiting from Libyan support for the French-speed forces, to open open traffic routes and demonstrate that no area is out of reach. Their action. At the same time, the French intervention has already been able to restore the authority of the Chadian State. Due to the significant volume of French losses, 50 deaths in 3 years, the EMFT (Major Franco-Chadien) is dissolved and the French presence is gradually reduced. In July 1971, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann is in favor of the

withdrawal of French troops; The operation ends in August 1972 when visiting President Pompidou in Chad.

## **THE ISSUES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN LIBYA**

In 2011, the military intervention in Libya is a multinational military operation under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), which took place between March 19, 2011 and October 31, 2011, whose objective is the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The names of the codes of the mandated by the United Nations are the operation of the United States, the Open Ellamy for the United Kingdom, the Odyssey Dawn operation for the United States, the Mobile Operation for Canada and the Open Unit Paultif for the NATO. During Libyan's Civil War 2011, UN resolution 1970 of February 26, 2011, executed under the name of American Unified Protector, which sets up an armor on arms to Libya and blocks among others the assets of the regime in place, while resolution 1973 establishes a zone of air exclusion above the territory of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and allows to "take all the measures considered deemed necessary to protect civilian populations". As of March 31, 2011, all operations are conducted by NATO as part of Operation Unified Protector. In March 2011, during the Libyan revolution, the fighting between the forces faithful to Colonel Moumarmar Kadhafi to those of the rebels opposed to his diet, would have made thousands of deaths. Insurgents who lost a lot of land have come out in Misrata and especially Benghazi. On the eve of the final assault against this last city, they are threatened with a bloody repression by the leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

On March 10, 2011, President Sarkozy receives in Paris the representatives of the National Transition Council and is the first head of state to officially recognize this organ of the insurgency as the only representative of Libya. The next day, March 11, 2011, France, with the support of the United Kingdom, submits to the Brussels summit a request for establishing an aircraft zone. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel refuses and collects the support of a majority of the 27 States of the European Union. President Sarkozy is found isolated at the G8 Summit in Paris. However, in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia gives the elements of the Qatar: King Abdallah has an old personal account to be paid with Mouammar Kaddafi, suspected of having been mixed with a project of attack against him, in 2003, at the time when he was heir



princess; And in March 2009, in Doha, Kadhafi described it to "gray puppet" of the British and Americans in front of all his Arab peers. The Arab League thus demands the introduction of this area of aircraft, which allows President Sarkozy and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé to launch a diplomatic battle to the United Nations Security Council. The advance of Kadhafi troops on Benghazi is such that a large magnity of the magazine is announced. President Obama joins President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron.

On March 19, two days after the vote of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 establishing an aircraft zone over the Libyan territory, the countries concerned meet in Paris for a special summit on any strikes against government forces. The day before, the Moumarmar Kadhafi regime had announced a ceasefire and the closing of their airspace, to be able to "comply with the UN resolution". Opponents in the plan feel that this is a "russe" for the purpose of gaining time. Indeed, the Libyan regime claims to respect the ceasefire he had himself decreased, but insurgents say that bombings against the opponents continue, in Misrata and Benghazi especially. However, these Benghazi bombing assets are not proven.

These regional and religious influence struggles are animated and supported by transnational networks whose ramifications extend abroad (Egypt, Tunisia, Qatar, Turkey, Abu Dhabi, etc.) as described Wolfram Lacher. Also, the country is currently led by two entities, the legitimate government recognized by the international community and that of Tripoli dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood that refuse to fade in the way that they lost the 2014 elections. The United Nation is the election to be organized in 2019 to resolve the crisis and measure the actual influence of forces in presence, namely those of Favez El-Serraj in the Tripoly region, the Marshal Haxar in Cyrenaic and part of Fezzan and the FAJR Libya militia on the Tripolitan coasts.

If exile networks link the States to the Libyan, ALC, a residual, the Windram LaCher's actors also stresses that the networks of foreign fighters in Libya represent a serious threat. These are enlisted jihadists in the ranks of NIE and Nigerian fighters, Chadian or Sudanese who have joined Libyan armed groups or have associated them as a mercenary, aguerris and armed, they should be, according to Wolfram Lacher, a real danger in the coming years for their states of origin.

## CONCLUSION

In short, the Sahelian zone is considered as the theatre of the conflict. This conflict is part of the context of the Sahel War and the reunited rebellions against the Malian state. Since the early 1990s, northern Mali is the theatre of several insurrections conducted by Touareg rebels. In the early 2000s, Algerian Jihadists also come to refuge clogging in Mali after their defeat during the Algerian civil war. In 2011, the Libyan civil war indirectly conflicts the conflict in Mali. Libyan military arsenals are piled up by armed groups, while Touareg mercenaries at the service of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya hunt to four a towards the Sahara and join rebel movements with arms and luggage. This Libyan crisis is a major event because Colonel Kaddafi was an essential actor of the regional political scene. Back in Mali after his fall, many Touareg strengthened the ranks of a new animated rebellion, also made again by Algerian Jihadists. For the first time, the independence of part of Mali (Azawad) was proclaimed, but the French military servile operation is very strategic in the Sahelian zone.

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