STATE SPONSORED MILITANCY : TRAJECTORIES FROM 'KASHMIR VALLEY' AND 'BASTAR'

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ABSTRACT

This is an attempt to put a brief comparative perspective on strategies of the Indian State that sponsored vigilante groups to contain 'militancy' in Kashmir Valley and Bastar. Starting from the early 1990s, the security establishment raised armed militias from the ranks of militants who were 'surrendered' and trained them as a shield against militancy in Kashmir. Popularly known as 'Ikhwans', they were organized as groups and set free to perform extrajudicial violence across Kashmir Valley in the face of ensuing demands for self-determination. Similarly, with mounting Maoist activities in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, both the central and state government extended full scale support to what emerged as 'Salwa Judum' vigilance that resulted in many cases of violations. State aided vigilante culture in both the places produced unique stories of humanitarian questions in the midst of concerns for national security. Led by powerful leaders like Mahendra Karma in Bastar and Kuka Parray and others in Kashmir, the coming of vigilantism stands as an eccentric testimony of the 'informal structures of violence' floated by the State. The study, while briefly looking into conceptual aspects of vigilantism, also explores comparative analysis of the process of interface between state, society and politics of conflict in both the places.

Keywords : State, Vigilantism, Conflict, Violence, Security

INTRODUCTION : GLOBAL AND INDIAN PRECEDENTS

In both *Jammu and Kashmir* and *Chhattisgarh*, the Indian state devised innovative strategies of extraordinary measures to dilute the challenge of long standing conflict. The delegation of security functions to the *informal militias* or *pro-government* group of armed civilians has global as well as domestic precedents. It was reported that millions have been displaced by these groups in conflict or civil war hatched by the state forces in different contexts globally. Commenting on the situation in Sudan, Human Rights Watch reported[i] that there has been strong evidence of the government of Sudan methodically aiding and sustaining the Janjaweed militias for its counter-insurgency operations. Militia's anatomy was strategically framed to raise its membership from specific ethnic groups so as to prolong the government's interests. Since 2003, this militia has unleashed serious attacks on civilians with impunity and support provided by the government in Sudan. In modern conflicts within the state boundaries, which is of civilian strife in nature, this method has been widely used. Oxford Research Encyclopedia elucidates [ii] examples such as US aiding Sunni Awakening groups, groups formed in Afghanistan to fight Taliban, militias used by Syria to fight internal wars, militias supported by Iran in the Middle East, various counter-insurgencies strategies in places like, Ukraine, and Nigeria. Before the end of the golden phase of colonialism, the beginning decades of the twentieth century witnessed the use of *auxiliary* forces by state actors as was seen in the British policy in Iraq, Ireland, and Palestine. Another glaring example of such groups in the recent modern period is the Arkan Tigers which is commonly called as Serbian Volunteer Guard that functioned for around a decade since early 1990s. This entity is known to have committed grievous human rights violations in Bosnia.[iii] According to Nandini Sundar, irrespective of the nature of regimes whether it is colonial, authoritarian or democratic, the software of counterinsurgency that circulates throughout the manuals and military training colleges across the globe is common that aims to coerce civilians into abandoning support for insurgents[iv]. There exist commonalities in the securitization process with respect to insurgencies in different contexts. "*The counter insurgency may be conducted directly by the police or army; cloak itself in the guise of popular anger against rebels; or employ vigilantes, including death squads, with the state claiming it is helpless to identify and act against criminals. Most counter insurgencies, however, officially deploy a combination of state and non-state actors against insurgents. Former insurgents turned pro-government mercenaries are organized as 'home guards',*

'special police officers', or paramilitaries who work as informers and also serve as the first line of attack . Often, villagers are also armed and conscripted into 'civil patrols' or village defense units to fight against insurgents''.[v] Like global counterparts, delegated securitization in India followed a pattern of similar consequences that is characterized by plunders, destruction of villages and burning, most of the time by categories of extrajudicial violence like murder, torture and rapes, detentions, and finally resulting forceful displacement of the local population to create what Nadini Sundar Calls *Model Villages*. As precedents to Kashmir and Bastar, a similar pattern of organized violence was seen in Telangana and Mizoram. Various organized pogroms right from Delhi 1984 and Gujarat 2002 to that of rightwing non-state policing around the country are testimonies that solidified the loopholes for the state to *pass-off* the responsibility thereby complicity.

As a colonial precedent, the Malaya experiment of the British colonial government in the 1950s and 1960s stands as a unique example that used *regrouping* of the local population so as to cut them off from getting influenced by the insurgents. This state strategy resembled later in the American *strategic hamlets* of Vietnam. Simultaneously, at the same period, India had witnessed such strategies in Khammam in Hyderabad State where around 1000 Koya villages were burnt in between 1949 and 1951.[vi] Khamman then had witnessed large scale displacement of local village population into military camps known as Ashok Nagar, Gandhi Nagar and Jawaharnagar.[vii] Raids, arrests, torture and sexual violence were also unleashed then to wipe out the CPI guerrilla movement of Telangana struggle that fought initially the private army of the Nizam of Hyderabad.[viii] Similarly in Mizoram, massive regrouping of the local villages were carried out as a consequence of the *Mizo National Front* declaring independence in 1966 and at the same time the Indian State also experimented this disconnection strategy to counter *Srikakulam Naxalite Uprising* (1957-70s) and the *Naga Armed Struggle* in 1950s.[ix]

In contravention to international conventions and constitutional principles, massive displacement and allied anomalies like involving forceful deprivation from basic needs characterized these strategies. The Article 14 of the Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Convention[x] focuses on the Protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, and prohibits attacks, destruction, and removal of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This included depriving people from food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and supplies and

irrigation works. The counter insurgency strategies have necessarily deprived this basic right in both the conflict zone. Following the earlier experiments in Kashmir and Nagaland, Village Defense committees were decided to be set up in Bastar on the lines of *civil patrols* of Guatemala that witnessed conscription of local population in the war. Since this plan could not materialize, Special Police officers (SPOs) were raised out of local villages in Bastar.[xi] The people who joined the ranks of SPOs were either former Maoists, or village level workers associated with *sangam* and participation in this vigilante network was not voluntary either since the expansion of the force was reported to have been realized by force especially during Slawa Judum rallies in Bastar.[xii] Those who leave Maoist politics are absorbed into this local army as was in the case of Ikhwans of Kashmir, SULFA (Surrendered United Liberation front of Asom) in Assam, or the Cats of Punjab.[xiii] In 2006 Karnataka government had assessed that Maoist recruitments were on the rise especially in the districts of Udupi, Chikmangalur, Dakshina Kannada, Shimoga, Tumkur, and Kolar and perceived that 75 police stations were vulnerable to 'naxal' attack. The Director General of Karnataka police then contended that personals will be raised to the 'India Reserve Battalion' from the *Naxal* affected districts as per the central government's guidelines.[xiv]

'SALWA JUDUM' AND 'IKHWANS' ON GROUND

1. *Nomenclature*

Salwa Judum is a band of *Adivasi* rebellious movements with crucial differences from that of the Maoists. In form and content it was said to be supported by local *Adivasis*, especially in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. A significant difference is that it came as a brainchild of the *administrative-political nexus* at various levels so as to build pressure from within to *Maoists*. Literally Salwa Judum meant the *movement for peace* or *carriers of peace* and its cadres were trained as combatants to fight against *Maoists* and the local *Adivasi*s who were trained and were officially recognized as Special Police Officers or in (SPO's) and it is reported that the state government had raised around 4000 SPO's for this purpose and they were remunerated from Rs 1500 to Rs 3000 per month as salary.

State sponsored vigilantism in Kashmir is the story of *Ikhawans*. The terms *Ikhwan force*, *Ikhwanis* and *Ikhwans* are interchangeably used in local parlance to denote what emerged as

the powerful vigilante force aided by the Indian State in Kashmir. *Ikhwans* is a broad terminology denoting a series of state's security functions which the Kashmiris popularly call as *renegade culture* since the heyday of militancy from 1990s. At some places of Kashmir Valley the force was locally regarded as *Nawabadis* and was widely regarded as the proxy arm of Indian Security agencies. The then popular outfit *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen* and its leader Kuka Parray had early in 1994 decided to cooperate with the Armed forces which were followed by a parallel force in Srinagar backed by State Police's Special Operations Group (SOG) and initiated by the former National Conference MLC, Javed Ahmad Shah. Later on, after Liaqat Khan joined the movement operating from South Kashmir's Anantnag, the three variants of vigilantism came under the banner of Ikhwanul Muslimeen.

2. *State Logic*

Instead of official government security forces to combat Maoism, the introduction of a quasi-official tribal force was meant to use the local agency of tribal identity of Chhattisgarh in the prolific fight for political legitimacy so as to realize hegemony of the lost ground. For this purpose, the state didn't find it unusual to train them in arms to unleash a unique kind of opposition from within. Many political commentators and the officials in the security establishment accept the fact that this strategy is a successor of what has been experimented in Kashmir already where the state had brought the agency of Ikhwans in combating militancy and the patterns seen in the organization and functioning of SPO's are a reminiscence of what had been the state strategy in Kashmir in the previous decades.

Vigilante gangs of Kashmir consisted of mainly indigenous Kashmiris who were either crossed over from the militant ranks or were at discontent with the perceived consequences of the militant war with the Indian State, more importantly surrendered militants from the ranks of prominent outfits like *Hizbul Mujahideen* and others. According to the proponents, these groups were significant in two respects. Primarily, they were a shield against militancy in combative terms, and secondarily, helped intelligence gathering for security agencies.

3. *Vigilantism on Ground*

Events surrounding the Salwa Judum experiments in Chhattisgarh show that there was a broader consensus on State sponsored vigilantism across socio-political divides. The state was continuously dominated by rightwing BJP at the level of governance and the idea of vigilante

force was championed by the Congress leader Mahendra Karma. Government of Chhattisgarh did not hesitate to bring this idea on ground and it reflects a manifested political agreement among the ruling class to combat Naxalism with social divide, pitting *Adivasis* against the *Adivasis*. Impact of Salwa Judum started with operations of the group in Maoist dominant citadels of Chhattisgarh. In 2008, there were Salwa Judum Camps in Bijapur and Dantewada, 23 camps of Salwa Judum were running actively.

Like what happened in Kashmir in early 1990s, the primary tasks of the vigilantes were to gather information of intelligence value to the police, most of the time with the help of local villagers. Socio-political impacts of the functioning of Salwa Judum camps in the Bastar had created hurdles for Maoist cadres. Locals were forced not to be in communication with Maoist cadres, not to provide refugee or hiding places, and barred from providing food and shelter. In many places, the emergent vigilante cadres aided and recognized by the state as the SPOs sought to identify Maoist presence under their surveillance and drove them away by force. The former Ikhwans account the contribution of this force in bringing normalcy in Kashmir. They point to the instrumental role played by the Ikhwan force in changing the political landscape towards the 1996 assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir.[xv] As a driving force of India's counter insurgency operations in Kashmir, the surrendered militants in the nascent period of militancy helped to realize the targets of *operations*. At times silent and other occasions open, *renegades* as they were known locally in Kashmir, assisted the armed men to put surveillance, track militants, and summon the militancy affected regions by crackdowns.

4. *Delegated Violence*

Government of Chhattisgarh had claimed that Salwa Judum was a spontaneous peoples' movement. The emergence of camps were said to be caused by the Maoist retaliation which had forced them to come out of the villages. Therefore despite contrary facts from the ground, state authorities still claim that there was no state's direct role in this clash. And state collusion was evident in many instances, which is clearer from the role played by Mahendra Karma. As against the claim that presence of security forces were solely meant for giving security to the Salwa Judum rallies, men in uniform were found supporting rallies of vigilante movements in which the quasi recognized SPOs have forced the local villagers to join what they regarded as *Naxal/Maoist hunt*. People who did not do so, including the village headmen, were threatened at gunpoint. Young men assigned in the tasks of Salwa Judum had unleashed a series of

violence including uncountable killings, most of which did not even come out in the purview of reportage and investigations. At least 644 villages were affected, over a thousand people killed, hundreds raped, and some 1,50,000 displaced. Small children were bashed to death or thrown into ponds, old people who could not run away were burnt alive. Yet there has been no prosecution or compensation, despite the Supreme Court's repeated orders.[xvi] Till 2013, given a list of 537 killings by Salwa Judum and security forces, the State Government ordered magisterial inquiries into eight cases since 2008, of which seven are still pending, and instead, the fortification of SPOs with better guns and more money as the renamed *Armed Auxiliary Forces* has aggravated the violence-prone situation in the region.[xvii]

At the aegis of India's armed forces and the legitimacy provided by the *lawlessness*, it was said that there were more than six counter-insurgency vigilante groups functioning in Kashmir. Like the Army, the actions of the *Ikhwans* were not accountable provided the undeclared impunity flowing from the structure. Abrar Falahi, a youth from Kulgam district elaborated that "*they have terrified the people and created absolute terror. I have personally seen the reign of Ikhwan terror as a boy in 1994, 95, and 96. They raided houses, took out the furniture and looted people. I have seen them torturing people with iron rode*".[xviii] Moreover, they were engaged in illegal construction, land grab and plunder as well as *hafta* levying. There are numerous allegations about *Ikhwan* members indulging in illegal drugs business and timber trade. The local transport operations were controlled by the dominance of a network controlled by the *Ikhwans* in Anantnag district during the mid 1990s. Pointing to the gravity of this situation Sanjay Kak puts that "*Islamabad (which is popularly accepted name of Anantnag) was the capital of stolen cars in Asia, Ikhwanis were free, with money and status to dominate the areas wherever they operated*".[xix] Recalling his childhood memories of the 1990s, Falahi said that "*Ikhwanis blessed with the Indian State functioned with sophisticated weaponries like AK 47 rifles, Grenade Launchers, sniper rifles, transmitters, and radios. Not only did they train their guns on militants but they did so against unarmed civilians as well. Using brutal methods they sought to extract information from locals. The weapons which were supposed to be used for fighting militancy were many times appropriated to settle personal scores, to extort and to realize selfish interests*".[xx] The people who faced the brunt of violence committed by these gangs say that in the garb of counter offensives, individual gangs sought to amass huge wealth by blackmail and plunder of properties both public and private.

5. *Enemy of the Enemies*

The face-off with the Salwa Judum had created a situation of retreat for Maoism from the battleground Bastar for some time. The natural response of the Maoist party was to resist vigilante intrusion into its stranglehold of villages by resisting it at all cost. Maoists through its local governance mechanism, what came to be known as *Janatana Sarkar, began* to identify the collaborators and punish them through an *Open Court* mechanism as a show of warning. And "*organized left-wing activity, associated with Naxal groups forms another stream of vigilantism, through the holding of people's courts to provide instant justice to villagers for whom the long procedural delays and costs of the formal justice system are serious barriers*".[xxi] Punishment meted out to the police informers amounted up to even death penalty. Such mechanisms as an example of counter offensive was possible for Maoists because of the virtue of their control over certain territories for last many decades since the 1990s and there is said to be many such strongholds what is locally known as *liberated zones* where the presence or intrusion of security forces even in sufficient number is considered to be difficult.

On the other hand, emerging from discord in the militant goals of the past decades, *Ikhwans* were an antithesis to the ideological synthesis of *Azaadi* movement in Kashmir. As such they were perceived as *anti-Pakistan* and in opposition to the nascent Islamized variant which was one of the many streams of contestation with the Indian State. For the same reason, the initial intra-militant divide pertaining to the definitive aspects of *Azaadi* was re-invoked as a major contradiction with respect to the *anti-India* militant organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Al Jihad and others. Not only the intra-militant rivalry had led to spiraling of violence and counter violence but also the development of the major rift along the militant ranks with *collaboration* and *crossover* also caused bloodshed as well as numerous deaths in Kashmir. Organizational shift of the surrendered militants was fraught with counterproductive results as many of them became a scapegoat between the unending fight between the Indian State and the militants with uncertain feature of *location aspects* of *functional identity* as to whether they are *still militants* or are they being recognized as integral to security establishment. The *positional identity crisis* emerged out of militant mobility from that of politically driven one to that of state induced one without official recognition of their agency functions made them vulnerable to militant attacks individually, and also at the level of society as is seen in the plight of the earlier Ikhwan families in different

parts of Kashmir Valley who are ostracized in the absence of proper rehabilitation, thereby carrying the brunt of the sins of their forefathers. Post 2000s witnessed a handful number of small groups of independent surrendered militants working in Kashmir in open and secret association with different security agencies but at the same time, the broad regime of *Ikhwan* formation was steamed by the two streams. *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon* under the leadership of Kuka Parray controlled the vigilante regimes of Sumbal Sonawari stretch of North Kashmir. A proximity to the international borders and the influence of foreign militants entering the region had influenced the way in which the army of Parray operated. Change in political preference of Parray also affected the whole group as it existed in this region. His coming to mainstream parliamentary activism initially through Awami League led to a moment of retreat. At the same time, Liaqat had led the *Ikhwan* operations in South Kashmir. He earlier collaborated with Parray but took an independent course in 1997 but met with the same fate of *defunct* path.

6. *Institutional Visages*

Public scrutiny of the experiment in Bastar drew the matter to the Courts and the case was decided at the level of Supreme Court thanks to interventions of full-time activists like Nandini Sundar and her comrades. In 2009, the Supreme Court verdict regarded quasi armed militias aided by state in Chhattisgarh as an act of illegality and in 2011, the apex Court declared the Salwa Judum unconstitutional. But even after this verdict, it is raised by the human rights activists that Salwa Judum did not disappear in substance. They argued that a political nexus in Chhattisgarh in collusion with central government tactically evaded the Court decision by accommodating erstwhile vigilante cadres in the state recognized Police System and in new vigilante forms, thereby bringing back the *terrors in disguise*.

A report puts that as early as in 2001 in Kashmir, "*while official records suggest that there are over 1,200 militants who have surrendered and are working with the security forces, unofficial estimates put them at around 2,200, of them 400 dead. The state government has managed the adjustment of 327 of them in the Border Security Force (BSF) and in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) while rest of them are either functioning with the state police's anti-militancy SOG (Special Operations Group) or with various other security agencies*".[xxii] By 2003, it was reported that there were between 350 and 500 *Ikhwans* operating in Kashmir who had prescribed duty with Jammu and Kashmir Police and the Army for which they were paid regular stipend.[xxiii] But the lack of earlier charm of the movement with strong leadership led to

the abandonment of hundreds of those associated with various streams of *Ikhwan* gangs. Triggering a controversy on Indian's State strategy in Kashmir, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar in 2015 had stressed the need of reviving the *renegade culture* in combating what he called as a need of *neutralizing terrorism* with *terrorists*, pointing to a reliability of getting *minimal collateral damages* on ground.[xxiv]

CONCLUSION: DELEGATED SECURITIZATION AS NEW WARFARE

An earlier report by JKCCS points to the moral-political impunity produced by the Indian state which was compounded by no prosecutions against the groups that contributed to the *structure of violence* in Kashmir.[xxv] The report cites the meager prosecutions of *Ikhwans*, Village Defense Committees and the semi-official Special Police Officers (SPOs). Lack of punishments helped these parallel armed groups to perpetuate violence without liability.[xxvi] At times, they were used as shields to cover up the crimes committed by men in uniform. Since their existence is not officially driven, the demands for prosecutions are fraught with state denials. It was this aspect which was a bone of contention that led to the Supreme Court verdict of 5 July 2011. The verdict rendered Salwa Judum illegal and unconstitutional. Similarities between Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh and the state sponsored militias in Jammu and Kashmir are striking. Continued reliance by the armed forces and the political class on such forces is striking, particularly as their numbers are far greater in Jammu and Kashmir (reportedly 23,783[xxvii]) than in Chhattisgarh (6500 as per the Supreme Court judgment[xxviii]). Former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Omar Abdullah once opined that there could be no comparison between Jammu and Kashmir and Chhattisgarh as the SPOs in Jammu and Kashmir were doing their regular duties.[xxix] This view is a complete negation of the ground realities of the violations committed by SPOs.

Pro-government vigilante's are groups that are supportive of governmental stance or sponsored by government, not see themselves as part of the regular security forces or functions with autonomy, armed and having an organized structure conducive to local conditions.[xxx] Even though vigilante groups also exist independently, such gangs as exist in the conflict zones of Jammu and Kashmir and Chhattisgarh are known for their linkages to the government. Nature of the vigilante relationship with the Government is important as it defines the nature of *agency*

problems and has consequences for the scale of violence. Based on new findings based on data analysis between 1982 to 2007 Sabine and others has found that in over 60 countries, the ruling dispensations have associated and extended sustenance to informal armed groups within their respective territories and argued that such linkages determined the nature as well as the scale of repression.[xxxi] By exploring the issues involved in monitoring and control that directly affected the scale of human rights violations, they argue that informal vigilante's had consequences on state accountability on twin fronts. That is *firstly*, it is strenuous for the government to supervise and train these groups at its behest as vigilantism involves private interests in functional aspects. *Secondly*, vigilante groups help the Government to *disown the responsibility* and *delegate problematic actions* thereby using force indirectly as a tactical move to bring about long term strategic goals. This would in turn lead to a high level of repression and evasion of accountability. And forgoing accountability takes multiple forms of which vigilante strategies are unique. The other areas where State find it easy to evade transparency are reflected in the modes of coercion that restricted human rights activism and media, and occurrences of enforced disappearances and fake encounters all of which ensured grounds for state denials.

Delegated securitization can also be looked with a 'principal-agent'[xxxii] analysis to weave out different aspects of vigilante strategies of the state. In economics and political science, the principal-agent dynamics is the division of *power goods* where agents when connected to the principal are blessed with autonomy in functional aspects. But the stipulated autonomy when lead to deviations in the principal goal aspects gives rise to dilemmas. Principal in this case is the Indian State and agents are the vigilante actors in Kashmir and Bastar. This approach helps to understand to what extent the *principal* Indian state controls vigilante functions outside the official *chain of command*. The agency dynamics get strained when these groups use *private* or *discretionary* interests to the realm of securitization. Since the vigilante groups are out of the formal *chain of command* and are ill trained in combat, their functions bring wrong interfaces in the conflict environment where the *state goals* and *autonomous goals* fuse into uncontrollable results causing skyrocketed human right violations. A unique agency contribution of these groups is the reliability to simply *shift responsibility* both moral and political, of the breaches they commit. Since the state has delegated its security task and is tacit in its back up to vigilante functions, neither the state nor the agent is accountable. Agent

autonomy in the conflict varies in nature and conduct. In Kashmir while Ikhwans used their autonomous positions for *self aggrandizement and terror* as was evident in the case of Ikwans like Rashid Billa, Papa Kishtwari, Rashid Khan and others, in Bastar Salwa Judum provided a space of *discretion* outside the procedures as was in the example of Kartam Surya who committed sexual violence and colluded in the infamous Morpalli, Tadmetla and Timmapuram attacks which the CBI recently found fault with the security establishment. The Indian State realizes a benefit of delegation in the context that it lacks the *time and skill* to combat that involves enemies of a *different* variety and the need for such a delegation arises out of the structure of *information asymmetry* in conflict zones where the State is unable to bring about surveillance without outsourcing the security functions.

Commentators like Kaldor and Janice Thompson trace the conventional approaches that considered the existence of pro-government militias from a vantage point of *Weberian* perspective where the *State* is understood as an entity in a drive to monopolize the means of violence or coercion. In her treatise on the functioning of informal armed groups, mainly *pirates* and *mercenaries*, Thompson as early as in 1994 had maintained that these groups were a characteristic of *states* in the track of asserting sovereignty over a period of centuries. On the basis of historical analysis rather than contemporary, she had maintained that in the 19th century, use of informal groups was *delegitimized* and *eliminated*.[xxxiii]

Mary Kaldor [xxxiv] makes a distinction between *old wars* and *new wars*. This difference according to her is resulted by globalization, its war economy and also the increasing role of identity politics. Based on a case study of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict of early 1990s and the contemporary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan she argues that the *new wars* are more fragmented and therefore plead for a *cosmopolitan* approach as a plausible solution for fragmented violence. Fragmented violence surfaced on the base of old crumbled cold war territories of Eastern Europe and Africa. Global technological revolution entrenched radical ideas and influences that caused militant mobilization of various kinds. Old wars were more centralized and involved territorial motives externally and were driven by *nationalism* and *ideology* in the nineteenth as well as in the twentieth century. Contrastingly, new wars are more internal, civil and low intensity in character which is embedded in unique *particularity* to spread influence and coercion. Fragmented new wars are devoid of state legitimacy thereby lacking control of tangible coercion, decentralized and also multilayered where global

dynamics of *identity* politics is also at work. According to Kaldor, pro-government militias are a new phenomenon that developed as a result of a blurring between public and private violence. Kaldor illustrates Iraq as a representation of a new *war* that is fought by a collusion of state and non-state actors. It characterized a disappearance of the fundamental distinction that existed with respect to the formal and informal use of violence. Local militant groups were used here as *low cost force multipliers* with respect to the state coalition based on expensive formal military forces. Use of *Sunni Awakening Militias* in Iraq is a unique testimony of this strategy and in situations of regime changes or post revolutionary period informal pro-government militias serve a different purpose and rationale altogether. The commissars of Bolshevik Russia and Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia of Iran existed as shadow armies that performed the monitoring of the inherited regular armed forces that were perceived as politically non-reliable. Notable is the assertion that the *new wars* are the outcome of dwindling autonomy and the weakened capacity of *States* which blurs the distinction between formal and informal use of violence where *State* is circumvented not by choice but by conditions.

Sabine and others maintain that a *Weberian* approach leads to consider delegated securitization as a sign of disorder or failed state. For them, an alternative way is to ponder into general incentives based on the questions of empirical examples. Sabine identifies *economic* and *political* incentives of pro-government vigilantes. *Former* included the extension of State's armed capability at cheap expenditure, bridge communication gaps, balance knowledge asymmetry, bringing frictions in enemy ranks, and helps directly and indirectly interact with the enemy, and the *latter* included gaining strategic timing and positions, gain legitimacy and public support, reduce government responsibility of delegated violence, helps in co-opting the opponent ranks and helps the government to *shift responsibility*, and assist it to stand in a mode of *plausible deniability*.[xxxv]

In both Kashmir and Chhattisgarh, the Indian State is waging a war on a regimented enemy often disorganized and diverse in motif and strategies. While the expression of discontent ranges from minor critiques or discontent to that of protests against the coercive state, a major challenge is the constant platoon militant actions. Since the anti-state movements in both the places have numerous tributaries, therefore constant securitization is a norm. But the attempts of curbing militancy are fraught with a *dilemma of politics*. Even after organizing numerous combative offensives, the *State* is unable to curb *militant politics* in its substance and content.

It is in this context that the state engages in a *fourth dimensional* warfare which is a war on political will.[xxxvi] War on politics is not only to be fought with mere physical security structures instead through deriving technologies to counter ideological battles on ground to mutate *legitimacy crises*. State is encountering a violent non-state actor in a vigorous battle against sovereignty for decades. Continuing war results in numerous casualties in terms of human loss, political repercussions and societal dilemmas but the battle still goes on and the state is unable to win over the enemy with conventional direct offensive tactics. Violent non-state actors here are militants in the case of Kashmir and Maoists as seen in Bastar. These non-state actors fight the battle at *physical*, *psychological* and *moral* level which on the questions of *domination*, *oppression* and *politics* respectively thereby produce imbroglio for the rulers. Since at both the places the enemy of the Indian State persists in a more flexible nomenclature, at times *over-ground* and most of the time *underground*, the state always anticipates unpredictable offensives in all spaces of securitization including *socio-cultural* and *economic-political* sphere. At times, challenges to the state take a different turn when militancy drives massive protests as we witness in Kashmir and resistance activism in Chhattisgarh which rather than rendering direct physical tangible losses to the State put it in *psychological-political* dilemmas of actions and non-actions. This *graduated onslaught* as leverage is the one which makes armed militants elevated to a stage of potential threat to be dealt with, pointing to the questions of *political crisis*.[xxxvii]

Emerging needs of decentralized strategies are therefore seen as to cope with this kind of challenge where the State delegates its security functions to informal groups which are raised with individuals in proximity of insurgent ranks and with ones crossed over from insurgent ranks. As seen in the cases of Kashmir and Bastar, these informal groups are then aided in all terms that the formal state limitations can be bridged through operations which are *covert* and *overt*, aided by authentic ground intelligence derived out of this *informal structure*. This at times weakened the technologies of militant infrastructure breaking their ranks itself as was the case of *intra-militant rivalries* of 1990s in Kashmir and budding *police-informer* networks in Chhattisgarh out of renegade Maoists.

It is from this premise that the *delegated securitization* by deputing security tasks of surveillance, vigilance and conformity to loosely organized groups is carried out. The process included an expansion of coercive structures of the State by assigning policing tasks to non-

state actors. This form of ad-hoc aspect in the state security regime is not new though, since we have witnessed such experiments earlier as prototypes in other parts of India. Regarding it as a new variety of securitization in narrow perception kills the colonial repressive precedents ingrained in India's Security regime. But at the same time, it also relegates the fact that the State always had porous boundaries with powerful elements in society. Post-colonial specificity of countries like India enabled different governments to often escape responsibility by a process of externalization of conflict resembling a *divide and rule* strategy of the colonial state.[xxxviii] Therefore, the *state sponsored vigilantism* rests in a tactical space of *liability transfer* where the State disowns crimes committed by its agents through a *strategic disjuncture* and the agents putting dock the State for inaction, consequently where justice is lost in the blame game.

ENDNOTES

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[iii] www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/26/serbian%20volunteer%20guard.pdf

[iv] Nandini Sundar, 'The Burning Forest: India's War in Bastar Hardcover'; Juggernaut; New Delhi, 2016

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] According to the Article 14 of the Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Convention, relating to the Protection of victims of non-international armed conflict 8 June 1077

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[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Tribal-youths-will-now-fight-Naxals/articleshow/1524958.cms?referral=PM

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[xvi] See Arup Kumar Sen; 'Killing of Mahendra Karma: An Act of Popular Justice'; Mainstream, VOL LI, No 26, June 15, 2013 https://mainstreamweekly.net/article4252.html

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[xviii] Abrar Falahi was interviewed on 13 December 2015

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xxxiv See Kaldor, Mary. 2007. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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