

BOKO HARAM AND NATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE FAR NORTH REGION OF CAMEROON: THE IMPACT OF SHARIA LAW-TERRORIST OVER THE NIGERIA STATES AND THE RECONVERSION OF ELITES FROM 1982 IN CAMEROON

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ABSTRACT

The Islamic State's West Africa Province formerly known as a Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad and commonly known as Boko Haram is a jihadist terrorist organization based in north-eastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon has seen the further decline of Boko Haram and the loss of much of the territory it once reportedly controlled. This movement is funded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, Boko Haram is an insurgent and terrorist movement of salafist jihadist ideology, originating in north-eastern Nigeria. This sect, whose name means "Western education is a sin," is responsible for several series of suicide bombings, kidnappings, and raids in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. Since it rages in Cameroon (2014), we note that is mainly in the north, precisely in the extreme north, that the terrorists have set their sights in locality of Guru 7 June 2014, Bargaram 24-25 July 2014, Amchidé and Limani on October 15 and 16, 2014, Amchidé on December 17, 2014, Achigachie on December 29, 2014, and Kolofata on January 12, 2015. More recently: Gakara (August 24, 2017), Mogoza (October 2, 2017), Mohala (November 5, 2017), Malfaré (November 6-7, 2017), leaving in its path victims, dead and houses burned. It should be noted that since 2014, more than 2000 civilians and soldiers have been killed by this sect, which, despite the efforts of the government, seems to blend in the mass. This situation makes Cameroon a crime center affected by insecurity in Central Africa and Nigeria. Boko Haram

was founded upon the principles of the Salafism advocating Sharia law. It developed into a Jihadist group in 2009. The movement is diffuse, and fighters associated with it follow the Salafi doctrine. Their beliefs tend to be centered on strict adherence to Wahhabism, which is an extremely strict form of Sunni Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as idolatrous. The group has denounced the members of the Sufi and the Shiite sects as infidels.

Keywords : Boko Haram, Native Authority, Far North Region Cameroon, Sharia Law Nigeria States, Elites

INTRODUCTION

The history of personal initiatives in the historical process is well-known to historical scientists. This is to be obeyed by the current logic of events that tend to place local governments above national and global interests. In a context marked by globalization. The national and class identities tend to be laced by local identities. The state begins to recompose itself and to be traced in many actors and authorities. At the moment we are witnessing in Cameroon, a change of tone in generalization, and hence in decentralization, that is to say, in the transfer of other State tasks to governments and local actors may be interested in a little better to the action of elites to fight against the insecurity of the Islamic State. As per the Islamic State in West Africa or Islamic State's West Africa Province formerly known as a Group of the People of Sunnah for preaching and Jihad and commonly known as Boko Haram is a jihadist terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon has seen the further decline of Boko Haram and the loss of much of the territory it once reportedly controlled.

This movement is funded by Mohammed Yusuf. As far as concern Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 from Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern state of Borno. he established a religious complex and school that attracted the poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status. The militant Islamic group working out of Nigeria, whose purpose is to institute Sharia, or Islamic law. In the local term, Boko Haram means "Western education is forbidden. Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youth, he is reported to have used the existing

infrastructure in Borno of the Izala Society (Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a popular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own faction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with people sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization.

The Council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored. Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status. Borno's Deputy Governor Alhaji Dibal has reportedly claimed that al-Qaeda had ties with Boko Haram, but broke them when they decided that Yusuf was an unreliable person. Stephen Davis, a former Anglican clergyman who has negotiated with Boko Haram many times blames local Nigerian politicians who support local bandits like Boko Haram in order for them to make life difficult for their political opponents. In particular Davis has blamed the former governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff, who initially supported Boko Haram, but no longer needed them after the 2007 elections and stopped funding them. From where our central question to know how the native authority of the Far north participated to fight against Boko Haram in the Far North region of Cameroon. What is the contribution of traditional authorities in the fight against Boko Haram? This question will be the thread of our analysis and will attempt to present the rule and the strategies of Native Authority to fight against Boko Haram in the Far North Region. From where our central question to know how the native authority of the Far north participated in the evolution of the second half of the XXth century, precisely between 1950 and 1999 further to identify a few elites with the great delicacy.

In the perspective of local history in the Far north, this disruption have participate in the local development, which have encourages the exacerbation of old forms of political inequality and the development of the traditional elite. The Islamic colonization introduced by Usman Dan Fodio in the North have encourage the implantation of the new forms of political organization with the installation of Lamidatal structures in the Northern Cameroon. The Europeans have collaborate with traditional leaders. The critics who obscured the room at the beginning of the twentieth century seem to be scientific. However, this point of view has a questionable

dimension in the measure does not highlight Thierno Mouetar Bah, "the events are the results of the dynamics.

For Severin Cecile Abega, the interest of a research work must be scientific and then utilitarian for the resolution of a research problem. It is in this logic that the interest of this study lies. On a scientific level, this work can be useful for the advancement of a historical science, thus being part of the history of African tradition, especially in the field of intervention of traditional authorities in the fight against terrorism. This work aims to understand the history of the African tradition in North Cameroon, with a focus on what the traditional authorities have to do in the face of terrorism, and to highlight the different strategies for combating terrorism. The world in general and in the extreme north of Cameroon in particular. It could be a repository or an interpellation between neighboring authorities with a collective idea in order to fight effectively the phenomenon that is terrorism.

In practical terms, this work can provide new elements that can contribute to a good mastery of terrorist strategies and allow the government to better know the values of traditional leaders in the maintenance of peace and national security. According to Abelard, the conceptual framework is an experiment related to the general idea of the concept. For that, we decided to proceed to the definition of the key concepts namely terrorism and traditional authorities.

THE CONTEXT OF NATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE FAR NORTH REGION OF CAMEROON

The native authority is a local representatives of the colonial government. They represented a form of the Indirect rule which had become popular in British African dependencies in the second quarter of the 20th century, although Nyasaland's Native Authorities had fewer powers and smaller incomes than similar institutions in other colonies. The Native Authority system worked reasonably effectively until after the Second World War, when their obligation to enforce unpopular government agricultural policies. After 1953, many of the powers of individual chiefs were transferred to councils which became the Native Authorities, although the chiefs sat on these councils. After independence, the authorities, renamed Traditional Authorities, continued to operate and the status and influence of many of the chiefs revived

through their cooperation. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the Native Authorities' link with the colonial governments in the British African dependencies caused their authority to become weakened and for educated new men to emerge as community leaders, or whether the new status and administrative and judicial powers given to them by those administrations allowed chiefs to shake-off the pre-colonial restrictions on their powers and become despotic. Setting up a hierarchy of tribal paramount chiefs, subordinate chiefs and village headmen may also have served to fix previously less rigid tribal identities.

African chiefs in the governance of the protectorate or to accept their authority. However, the poverty of the administration and the eagerness of many chiefs to secure official recognition lead to the District Administration (Native) Ordinance, 1912, which allowed the governor to appoint Principal Headmen, who had only such authority and stipends as the residents (later district commissioners) for their district allowed them. Most Principal Headmen were prominent local chiefs, although in some cases preference was given to mission-educated candidates. Each Principal Headman was made responsible for a number of Village Headmen, although it was made clear that the arrangement was not intended to foster or perpetuate rule by chiefs. Amendments to the 1912 Ordinance in 1924 and 1929 extended the powers of the Principal Headmen to hear civil cases under customary law, collect hut taxes and issue certain licences.

The evolution of the second half of the XXth century, precisely between 1950 and 1999 further to identify a few elites with the great delicacy. In the perspective of local history in the Far north, this disruption has participated in the local development, which have encouraged the exacerbation of old forms of political inequality and the development of the traditional elite. The Islamic colonization introduced by Usman Dan Fodio in the North have encourage the implantation of the new forms of political organization with the installation of Lamidal structures in the Northern Cameroon. The Europeans have collaborated with traditional leaders. The critics who obscured the room at the beginning of the twentieth century seem to be scientific. However, this point of view has a questionable dimension in the measure does not highlight Thierno Mouetar Bah, "the events are the results of the dynamics. In short, the traditional leaders played a very important role in the security needed in their respective regions, by creating vigilance committees and raising awareness among the population, while denouncing the suspects and secret agents of the Boko Haram. Despite the fact that terrorists

are difficult to identify, thanks to the vigilance of traditional leaders, the administrative authorities and the army manage to stop and destabilize this phenomenon that sows' terror and desolation in towns and villages at the extreme. North Cameroon.

THE RECONVERSION OF ELITES FROM 1982

The reconversion of elites from 1982 and its repercussions on the urban periphery have characterized the course of the 1980s policy. In this context the economic crisis of 1985 remains is a good illustration. It is by reaction to this coon that the elites of far north consider investing better until now remained the prerogative. In order to make these reconversions it is advisable to make an incursion into the local elite. Their main activity and their first source of wealth is the particular object of care, to which a great deal is attached here is an element of social stratification. In 1985, most local elites relied on it for support.

The relationship between the elites and intelligible, it is advisable to react on some cases according to the considered historical periods. The struggle for influence and prestige at the local level is one of the elites who all want to be the most visible. This antagonism grew in importance, noting Lamibe, embodying the traditional power and representatives of the state traditional leaders will be forced to share their power with the authorities. Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire in 1900 as Colonial Nigeria, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903, both the Borno Emirate and Sokoto Caliphate came under the control of the British. Christian missionaries at this time spread the Christian message in the region and had many converts. British occupation ended with Nigerian independence in 1960.

Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria was governed by a series of military dictatorships from 1966 until the advent of democracy in 1999. Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one of the causes of the 1967– 1970 civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city in the north of the country, where the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine ("followers of Maitatsine") instigated riots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths. In the ensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was

killed, fuelling a backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities over the next twenty years. Social inequality and poverty contributed both to the Maitatsine and Boko Haram uprisings. In the decades since the end of British occupation, politicians and academics from the mainly Islamic North have expressed their fundamental opposition to Western education. Political ethno-religious interest groups, whose membership includes influential political, military and religious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they were largely suppressed under military rule. Their paramilitary wings, formed since the country's return to civilian rule, have been implicated in much of the sectarian violence in the years following. The Arewa People's Congress, the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum, the main political group representing the interests of northern Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging in military action.

THE CONCEPT OF BOKO HARAM

According to the following, the concept BOKO HARAM coming from the Hausa language and meaning "the Western school is a sin", is an insurrectional and terrorist movement of Salafist jihadist ideology, organized in northern Nigeria. This movement aims to establish a caliphate and apply sharia law. It is a sect that advocates a radical and rigorous Islam, hostile to any Western influence. It launched an armed uprising in 2009 whose founder is Mohammed Yusuf and the following year (2010) Abubakar Shekau became a leader and will take revenge. The latter will be supported by the major terrorist movements of the world such as: Al Qaeda, Daesh and also billionaires such as Bill Gate (secret documents have demonstrated this). Then Abubakar Shekau propagated the armed struggle (insurrections, kamikazes, attacks) although in Nigeria and beyond the borders and especially the far-north Cameroon. Steps have been taken by the government and traditional leaders to deal with these terrorists. What is the contribution of traditional authorities in the fight against Boko Haram? This question will be the thread of our analysis.

THE ORIGIN OF BOKO HARAM

After the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, Abubakar Shekau took over in 2010 and advocated the war against the federal state of Borno and then launched into the basin of Lake Chad, where Cameroon is located in the southwest, Chad in the East and Nigeria in the West. In Cameroon and more precisely in the far north, the latter struck the 14 July 2015 Fotokol where about 30 people were killed and 20 wounded. In the Maroua-kousseri axis, records villages that have been looted and marginalized; the inhabitants were taken hostages. Maroua will also be struck on July 26 of the same year, leaving several civilian casualties. The Cameroonian state is making arrangements to face this group of evil-minded individuals who are boko Haram, without faith or law and declare war. From then on, the population, the administrative authorities and the traditional chiefs took the responsibility of defending their territory by denouncing any suspect person. The traditional chiefs created vigilance committees to sensitize the populations of the remote areas (villages ...), as well as in the cities of the far north for the security of the borders and the population. The vigilance committees have taken firm and drastic measures for the safety of public spaces such as: markets, places of worship and places of worship (mosque, church), schools and universities, without forgetting the means and agencies and transport (Danay, Tourist ...).

Created in 2002, Boko Haram is an insurgent and terrorist movement of salafist jihadist ideology, originating in northeastern Nigeria. This sect, whose name means "Western education is a sin," is responsible for several series of suicide bombings, kidnappings, and raids in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. Since it rages in Cameroon (2014), we note that is mainly in the north, precisely in the extreme north, that the terrorists have set their sights: Guru 7 June 2014, Bargaram 24-25 July 2014, Amchidé and Limani on October 15 and 16, 2014, Amchidé on December 17, 2014, Achigachie on December 29, 2014, and Kolofata on January 12, 2015. More recently: Gakara (August 24, 2017), Mogoza (October 2, 2017), Mohala (November 5, 2017), Malfaré (November 6-7, 2017), leaving in its path victims, dead and houses burned. It should be noted that since 2014, more than 2000 civilians and soldiers have been killed by this sect, which, despite the efforts of the government, seems to blend in the mass. This situation makes Cameroon a crime center affected by insecurity in Central Africa and Nigeria.

EXPANSION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

The attack on Gwoza signalled a change in strategy for Boko Haram, as the group continued to capture territory in north-eastern and eastern areas of Borno, as well as in Adamawa and Yobe. Attacks across the border were repelled by the Cameroon military. The territorial gains were officially denied by the Nigerian military. In a video obtained by the news agency AFP on 24 August 2014, Shekau announced that Gwoza was now part of an Islamic caliphate. The town of Bama, 70 kilometres (45 mi) from the state capital Maiduguri, was reported to have been captured at the beginning of September, resulting in thousands of residents fleeing to Maiduguri, even as residents there were themselves attempting to flee. The military continued to deny Boko Haram's territorial gains, which were, however, confirmed by local vigilantes who had managed to escape. The militants were reportedly killing men and teenage boys in the town of over 250,000 inhabitants. Soldiers refused orders to advance on the occupied town; hundreds fled across the border into Cameroon, but were promptly repatriated. Fifty-four deserters were later sentenced to death by firing squad. On 17 October, the Chief of the Defence Staff announced that a ceasefire had been brokered, stating: "I have accordingly directed the service chiefs to ensure immediate compliance with this development in the field". Despite a lack of confirmation from the militants, the announcement was publicised in newspaper headlines worldwide. However, within 48 hours the same publications were reporting that Boko Haram attacks had continued unabated. It was reported that factionalisation would make such a deal particularly difficult to achieve. The militants were reportedly killing men and teenage boys in the town of over 250,000 inhabitants. (Bureau of Counterterrorism. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 7 August 2014). Soldiers refused orders to advance on the occupied town; hundreds fled across the border into Cameroon, but were promptly repatriated. Fifty-four deserters were later sentenced to death by firing squad

LOCATION OF THE TOWN OF MUBI WITHIN ADAMAWA STATE

On 29 October, Mubi, a town of 200,000 in Adamawa, fell to the militants, further undermining confidence in the peace talks. Thousands fled south to Adamawa's capital city, Yola. Amid media speculation that the ceasefire announcement had been part of President Jonathan's re-

election campaign, a video statement released by Boko Haram through the normal communication channels via AFP on 31 October stated that no negotiations had in fact taken place. Mubi was said to have been recaptured by the army on 13 November. On the same day, Boko Haram seized Chibok, but two days later the army recaptured the largely deserted town. As of 16 November it was estimated that more than twenty towns and villages had been taken control of by the militants. On 28 November, 120 died in an attack at the central mosque in Kano during Friday prayers. There were 27 Boko Haram attacks during the month of November, killing at least 786. On 3 December, it was reported that several towns in North Adamawa had been recovered by the Nigerian military with the help of local vigilantes and Bala Nggilari, the governor of Adamawa state, said that the military were aiming to recruit 4,000 vigilantes. On 13 December, Boko Haram attacked the village of Gumsuri in Borno, killing over 30 and kidnapping over 100 women and children.

NIGERIAN STATES WITH SHARIA LAW SHOWN IN GREEN

Boko Haram was founded upon the principles of the Salafism advocating Sharia law. It developed into a Jihadist group in 2009. The movement is diffuse, and fighters associated with it follow the Salafi doctrine. Their beliefs tend to be centered on strict adherence to Wahhabism, which is an extremely strict form of Sunni Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as idolatrous.

THE PRESENCE OF BOKO HARAM IN CAMEROON

Boko Haram continued to increase its presence in northern Cameroon. On 16 May, ten Chinese workers were abducted in a raid on a construction company camp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles and explosives were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroon soldier was killed. Cameroon's antiterrorist Rapid Intervention Battalion attempted to intervene but were vastly outnumbered. In July, the deputy prime minister's home village was attacked by around 200 militants ; his wife was kidnapped, along with the Sultan of Kolofata and his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers and police, were killed in the raid. The deputy prime minister's wife was subsequently released in October, along with 26 others including the ten

Chinese construction workers who had been captured in May ; authorities made no comment about any ransom, which the Cameroon government had previously claimed it never pays. In a separate attack, nine bus passengers and a soldier were shot dead and the son of a local chief was kidnapped. Hundreds of local youths are suspected to have been recruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border town of Gwoza was overrun and held by the group.

In response to the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian president sacked two senior military officers and sent his army chief with 1000 reinforcements to the northern border region. Between May and July 2014, 8,000 Nigerian refugees arrived in the country, up to 25 percent suffering from acute malnutrition. Cameroon, which ranked 150 out of 186 on the 2012 UNDP HDI, hosted as of August 2014 107,000 refugees fleeing unrest in the CAR, a number that was expected to increase to 180,000 by the end of the year. A further 11,000 Nigerian refugees crossed the border into Cameroon and Chad during August.

ATTACKS IN CAMEROON

In the second half of December, the focus of activity switched to the Far North Region of Cameroon, beginning on the morning of 17 December when an army convoy was attacked with an IED and ambushed by hundreds of militants near the border town of Amchide, 60 kilometres (40 mi) north of the state capital Maroua. One soldier was confirmed dead, and an estimated 116 militants were killed in the attack, which was followed by another attack overnight with unknown casualties.[165] On 22 December, the Rapid Intervention Battalion followed up with an attack on a Boko Haram training camp near Guirdivig, arresting 45 militants and seizing 84 children aged 7– 15 who were undergoing training, according to a statement from Cameroon's Ministry of Defense. The militants fled in pick-up trucks carrying an unknown number of their dead; no information on army casualties was released.

On 27-28 December, five villages were simultaneously attacked, and for the first time the Cameroon military launched air attacks when Boko Haram briefly occupied an army camp. Casualty figures were not released. According to Information Minister Issa Tchiroma. The Cultural and geographical knowledge will help the government to better identify and detect

Boko Haram agents, thanks to traditional leaders. In addition, the Government has deployed and taken favorable measures to help the leaders who are constantly restoring peace.

THE RULES OF THE NATIVE AUTHORITY

In short, the traditional leaders played a very important role in the security needed in their respective regions, by creating vigilance committees and raising awareness among the population, while denouncing the suspects and secret agents of the Boko Haram. Despite the fact that terrorists are difficult to identify, thanks to the vigilance of traditional leaders, the administrative authorities and the army manage to stop and destabilize this phenomenon that sows terror and desolation in towns and villages at the extreme. North Cameroon.

As far as the Far North is concerned, it should be noted that this is the most populated region with a high population density. What makes the latter, a region in miniature with a multitude of cultural diversities and a dynamic population with a profitable agriculture thus participating in the improvement of the economic conditions punctuated on a development mastered. Hence the words of the President of the Republic, His Excellency Paul Biya who in his speech on February 10, 2016, he points an accusing finger at an Android generation with a numerical economy punctuated on field work so says "the earth does does not betray in other words agriculture is an economy in that it is possible to earn a lot with little. In addition, the area of this city is estimated at about 34246km² and its population is 2721500 inhabitants according to the MINPAT census of 2008.

This region has six departments namely the department of Diamaré chief town Maroua, Logone and Chari, chief- place Kousséri, Mayo-Danay chief town Yagoua, Mayo-Kani chief town Kaélé, mayo-Sava chief town Mora and Mayo-Tsanaga chief town Mokolo. Thus, it emerges from this analysis that North Cameroon is the engine of economic life in Cameroon because of its immense territory with a high population density not only but very fertile area favorable to the development of the agro-pastoral sector. But this part of the country has undergone abrupt and violent changes, especially with the arrival of Westerners and the phenomenon of slavery without forgetting the devaluation of the CFA Franc. This puts Cameroon in the context of the highly indebted poor countries. It is therefore from 1966, when Cameroon undertakes bilateral

cooperation with Saudi Arabia and multilateral with the Maghreb and some countries of the Persian Gulf. But in reality, it is with Saudi Arabia that Cameroon reaches its completion point with a cultural diversity appreciated. This cooperation is much more accentuated towards the North, because this part of the country is in majority Moslem.

Conduct an article on the notion of traditional authorities and terrorism in the far north of Cameroon, requires prior consultation of work that is similar to the subject and which address similar themes. To approach this analysis, we will make use of the explanatory documents that address this topic, because for a scientific study, we must look for documents that are close to the subject and address the themes at the center of the problem.

The study of the article addressed poses several problems beforehand. Admittedly, despite the permanent presence of the police and the commitment of the traditional authorities in the fight against terrorism, the BOKO HARAM sect continues to increase its attacks, especially in remote areas such as villages from the far north of Cameroon. In such a context, our main concern is: What are the areas of intervention of the traditional authorities of northern Cameroon in the fight against the terrorist sect BOKO HARAM? And what are the stakes.

The answer to the main question of this study should make it possible to reach a certain number of objectives. These objectives can be divided into main objectives and specific objectives. In general, this article aims to apprehend the areas of intervention of the traditional authorities in the fight against terrorism in the Chadian basin in an attempt to draw up a balance sheet in order to envisage strategies relating to the BOKO HARAM phenomenon. Specifically, this work involves:

- Show the authorities' contribution in the fight against terrorism
- To show the link that exists between traditional authorities and the government in the fight against BOKO HARAM in Cameroon
- Show the relationship between military administrative authorities and traditional authorities in the fight against BOKO HARAM in the far north of Cameroon
- Consider an ideal local and strategic policy for the eradication of BOKO HARAM in the Cameroonian territory in general and that of the extreme north in particular

-Present the geostrategic stakes of the traditional authorities against BOKO HARAM. All scientific work is very often littered with hardships or difficulties. These difficulties are as numerous as the researcher is amateur. It is in this sense that, aware of our amateurism in the field of research, certain difficulties can be felt a priori. Without pretending to have everything enumerated, these few difficulties give us a foretaste of the delicacy of the work we are going to tackle. It is by braving or bypassing all these difficulties that we can then achieve the desired results.

CONCLUSION

In the end, there was a question in this work of unravelling the social mechanization in the north region. It was also a question of the incidence of the presence of the elites, to analyze their means of action in the second half of the twentieth century. From our reflection, it emerges that the social changes have obey both a national political context and the specific realities of the locality. At the national level, the colonization of dependency and the partitioning of the state, initiated by the political sovereignty in 1960, imply de facto the need of a new type of men for the state structures. In addition, the change of man intervened to the State in 1982, the conspiracy of 1983 and the coup attempt of April 6, 1990 to that the democratic opening of 1990-1991 accelerated the mutations asset leadership Cameroonian. At the local level. It is perhaps in this sense that Bivert's remarks should be taken for whom, local authorities are places where the interests of the local or global interests are built around the defense of local, global or particular interests and political formerly conditioned the family noble families, member of the faada.

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